全年純利增長61%，賺80.6億美，主要是20大持股在去年全面升值，巴郡的普通持股在去年12月底價值590.34億美元。
巴菲特預期，美樓市明年見底，在約1年後住房的問題將會遠去，房價格將會遠遠低於泡沫時期的水平，屆時房屋的賣方或放款人雖然會受到損失，但相對地，房屋買家會從中獲益。
當年巴郡投資在比亞迪(1211)的金額達2.3億美元，持有近一成股份，現時該批股份市值超逾19億美元，錄得賬面賺7.56倍。另外，巴郡投資的可口可樂去年股價升幅達兩成九；富國銀行升一倍；美國運通升兩倍。
巴郡截至去年底最大持股為美國運通，共持有該公司12.7%股權；其次為比亞迪；可口可樂則排第三位，持股比重為8.6%。根據美國證監會的資料，巴郡已分別把藥廠Sanofi-Aventis及英國最大零售商Tesco的持股，增持至1.9%及3%。
巴菲特在致股東信函中表示，儘管巴郡仍在擴張，但該公司一如過去多年大幅跑贏大市的機會已急降，未來的趨勢可能仍會令投資者「不悅」。巴郡股價過去一年共上升了五成二。
巴郡去年業績增長為歷來其中最佳的一年，但仍然遜於標普500指數的26.5％升幅。這是巴郡歷來第7次遜於大盤表現。不過由1965年起計算，巴郡每年增長平均達20.3%，較標普500指數的9.3%要高得多。2月中，巴郡正式被納入標普500成分股，還吸引了大批投資者。
BRK-A:
BRK-B:
2010年 股東的信
股神巴菲特在今年給股東的一封20頁長的信中，照例先向股東報告這一年的成績，但也不忘教育新股東，希望他們多了解公司的一切。他還提醒股東，面對千載難逢的投資機會，絕對不要猶豫。
波克夏在2月時新添約6.5萬名新股東，主要是來自去年以267億美元收購的伯靈頓北方聖大菲鐵路公司（BNSF）。這些新股東可能比較不熟悉巴菲特的投資和經營哲學，所以巴老在信中強調，希望所有股東都能了解波克夏的營運、目標、限制和文化。
巴菲特要求所有人、尤其是新股東，能細讀信中揭示的公司原則，「希望為BNSF的新人上一堂『新生訓練』，也幫所有老股東溫故知新。」
整體而言，去年是Berkshire Hathaway(巴郡)豐收的一年。公司持有的普通股淨價值，成長一倍至240億美元。在13檔市場價值超過10億美元的持股中，有八檔遠高於巴菲特當時買進的成本；尤其是可口可樂、美國運通和寶鹼（P&G），帳面獲利更可觀，至少在45億美元以上。
但康菲石油（ConocoPhillips）、卡夫食品（Kraft）和美國銀行集團（US Bancorp）這三檔持股的價值，最多卻銳減逾8億美元。巴老去年大幅縮減康菲石油的持股，卻仍無法止血，該股股價今年又跌5%至48美元附近，遠低於當時他購入的72美元。
在旗下其他公司表現方面，他提到市場關心的NetJets飛機租賃公司表現。該公司全年虧損7.11億美元，但他保證今年可能會轉虧為盈，只要美國經濟不再惡化，或者私人飛機租賃界出現負面發展。
巴老還預言，一年內住宅不動產市場的問題大多應該就會遠離，而過去這動盪的兩年，其實是最佳的投資時機。他覺得最佳的機會點是債券市場，可惜波克夏沒有多買一點。
他在信中寫道：「去年我告訴各位，當時公司和市政債市場存在相當不尋常的狀況，這些證券的價格相較於美國公債顯得出奇地低。我們看出這個情況也進場買了一些，但我應該多買一點。大好機會難得降臨，當天上掉下黃金時，要拿桶子去裝。」
巴菲特也說，在金融風暴最嚴重時期，他投資高盛和奇異（GE）等大企業的策略，就股利而言得到豐厚的回報。
巴菲特給我們的幾點啟示
致股東信中，他向新投資者解釋了他的信條：
保持流動性充足。他寫道，我們決不會對陌生人的好意產生依賴，我們對自己事務的安排，一定會讓我們極有可能面臨的任何現金要求在我們的流動性面前顯得微不足道﹔另外，這種流動性還將被我們所投的多家、多樣化的公司所產生的利潤流不斷刷新。
大家都拋時我買進。巴菲特寫道，在過去兩年的混亂中，我們把大量資金用起來﹔這段時間對於投資者來說是極佳時期，因為恐慌氣氛是他們的最好朋友……重大機遇難得一見，當天上掉金時﹐要拿一個大桶而不是頂針去接。
大家都買時我不買。巴菲特寫道，那些只在評論家都很樂觀時才投資的人，最後都是用極高的代價去買一種沒有意義的安慰。從他這句話推導，顯然是要有耐心。如果人人都在買進時你做到了按兵不動，那麼只有在人人都拋售時你才能買進。
價值﹐價值﹐價值。巴菲特寫道﹐投資中最重要的是你為了什麼而給一家公司投錢──通過在股市中購買它的一個小部分──以及這家公司在未來一二十年會掙多少。
別被高增長故事愚弄。巴菲特提醒投資者說，他和伯克希爾副董事長芒格(Charlie Munger)不投那些“我們不能評估其未來的公司”，不管它們的產品可能多麼讓人興奮。
多數在1910年賭押汽車業、1930年賭飛機或在1950年下注於電視機生產商的投資者，到頭來輸得一無所有﹐儘管這些產品確實改變了世界。“急劇增長”並不一定帶來高利潤率和高額資本回報。喂﹐有沒有人下注於中國？
理解你所持有的東西。巴菲特寫道，根據媒體或分析師評論進行買賣的投資者不適合於我們。
防守好於進攻。巴菲特寫道，雖然我們在某些市場上揚的年頭裡落後於標普指數，但在標普指數下跌的11個年頭裡，我們的表現一直好過這一指數﹔換句話說，我們的防守一直好於進攻，這種情況可能會繼續下去。在動盪年代，巴菲特的這些建議都是符合時宜的。
P.15: An Inconvenient Truth (Boardroom Overheating)
Our subsidiaries made a few small “bolt-on” acquisitions last year for cash, but our blockbuster deal with BNSF required us to issue about 95,000 Berkshire shares that amounted to 6.1% of those previously outstanding. Charlie and I enjoy issuing Berkshire stock about as much as we relish prepping for a colonoscopy.
The reason for our distaste is simple. If we wouldn’t dream of selling Berkshire in its entirety at the current market price, why in the world should we “sell” a significant part of the company at that same inadequate price by issuing our stock in a merger?
In evaluating a stock-for-stock offer, shareholders of the target company quite understandably focus on the market price of the acquirer’s shares that are to be given them. But they also expect the transaction to deliver them the intrinsic value of their own shares – the ones they are giving up. If shares of a prospective acquirer are selling below their intrinsic value, it’s impossible for that buyer to make a sensible deal in an all-stock deal. You simply can’t exchange an undervalued stock for a fully-valued one without hurting your shareholders.
Imagine, if you will, Company A and Company B, of equal size and both with businesses intrinsically worth $100 per share. Both of their stocks, however, sell for $80 per share. The CEO of A, long on confidence and short on smarts, offers 11⁄4 shares of A for each share of B, correctly telling his directors that B is worth $100 per share. He will neglect to explain, though, that what he is giving will cost his shareholders $125 in intrinsic value. If the directors are mathematically challenged as well, and a deal is therefore completed, the shareholders of B will end up owning 55.6% of A & B’s combined assets and A’s shareholders will own 44.4%. Not everyone at A, it should be noted, is a loser from this nonsensical transaction. Its CEO now runs a company twice as large as his original domain, in a world where size tends to correlate with both prestige and compensation.
If an acquirer’s stock is overvalued, it’s a different story: Using it as a currency works to the acquirer’s advantage. That’s why bubbles in various areas of the stock market have invariably led to serial issuances of stock by sly promoters. Going by the market value of their stock, they can afford to overpay because they are, in effect, using counterfeit money. Periodically, many air-for-assets acquisitions have taken place, the late 1960s having been a particularly obscene period for such chicanery. Indeed, certain large companies were built in this way. (No one involved, of course, ever publicly acknowledges the reality of what is going on, though there is plenty of private snickering.)
In our BNSF acquisition, the selling shareholders quite properly evaluated our offer at $100 per share. The cost to us, however, was somewhat higher since 40% of the $100 was delivered in our shares, which Charlie and I believed to be worth more than their market value. Fortunately, we had long owned a substantial amount of BNSF stock that we purchased in the market for cash. All told, therefore, only about 30% of our cost overall was paid with Berkshire shares.
In the end, Charlie and I decided that the disadvantage of paying 30% of the price through stock was offset by the opportunity the acquisition gave us to deploy $22 billion of cash in a business we understood and liked for the long term. It has the additional virtue of being run by Matt Rose, whom we trust and admire. We also like the prospect of investing additional billions over the years at reasonable rates of return. But the final decision was a close one. If we had needed to use more stock to make the acquisition, it would in fact have made no sense. We would have then been giving up more than we were getting.
P.16:
When stock is the currency being contemplated in an acquisition and when directors are hearing from an advisor, it appears to me that there is only one way to get a rational and balanced discussion. Directors should hire a second advisor to make the case against the proposed acquisition, with its fee contingent on the deal not going through. Absent this drastic remedy, our recommendation in respect to the use of advisors remains: “Don’t ask the barber whether you need a haircut.”
Berkshire’s Corporate Performance vs. the S&P 500
